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POSTSCRIPT, SPRING 1998: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS BERNSTEIN AND FRANKE
Kathryn Abramst
In the year since this forum first began to take shape, the term
"sexual harassment" has been almost constantly on the lips of pundits
and in the headlines of newspapers. Allegations that President Clin-
ton engaged in sexual misconduct with a series of female employees
have, of course, claimed the lion's share of attention. Public response
to the allegations, and counter-allegations, has conditioned not only
the way that people view the Presidency, but also the way that they
respond to the claim of sexual harassment itself.' But factors other
than the allegations against the President have helped to keep sexual
harassment in the public eye. It is these other factors which may be a
portent of the future direction of this body of law.
The Supreme Court has taken a record number of sexual harass-
ment cases this term. The four on the docket comprise twice as many
as the Court has decided in the history of the claim, and they reflect
many areas which have heretofore evaded decisive resolution: same-
sex sexual harassment,2 respondeat superior liability,3 the application
of these elements to cases involving the public schools, 4 and more.5
Moreover, the first case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,6 was
resolved in an unusually brief, unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia,
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to the organizers and partici-
pants at Yale Law School's Sexual Harassment Symposium, at which I first presented some
of these ideas, and to Martha Chamallas, Katherine Franke and Bill Kell for conversations
that helped to develop them.
1 This point was made recently in an editorial by Professor Anita Hill. Anita Hill, A
Matter of Definition, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1998, at A21. Hill argues that
[I] n our new national conversation on sex, including our discussions of the
PaulaJones lawsuit and the resulting revelations from Monica Lewinsky and
Kathleen Willey, the references to sexual harassment have expanded far
beyond the legal prescriptions. The term has become a clich6, and the
perception of sexual harassment as a civil rights violation is now
diminished.
Id.
2 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 988 (1998).
3 See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438
(1997).
4 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 595 (1997).
5 SeeJansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted
in part, sub nom. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
6 118 S. Ct. 988 (1998).
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holding that same-sex sexual harassment can be actionable under Ti-
tle VII.7
Oncale is in many respects an enigma. In an effort to give a con-
clusive answer to a case that, by all appearances, he would have pre-
ferred not to have had to consider,8 Justice Scalia skirted the "what,"
the "how" and the "why" of sexual harassment. He declined to discuss
all but the most basic outline of the facts,9 offered no theory of the
wrong that purports to explain why same-sex cases should be included
in Title VII's ambit, and provided only a few hints as to how decision-
making in these cases should occur. Yet in other respects the case is
implausibly promising. Scalia's invocation of the "reasonable person
in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances"'" 0 has a
greater potential for group-based specificity than even the much-
lauded opinion in Harris v. Forklift." The Oncale opinion contains a
remarkable call for contextualization in the assessment of sexual har-
assment,' 2 tempered only by Scalia's confident and perhaps solipsistic
7 Id. at 1003.
8 Justice Scalia's opinion strikes me as holding the sexual harassment claim some-
what uncomfortably at arms length. My perception may be colored in part by the striking
lack of solicitude Justice Scalia has manifested toward constitutional discrimination claims
raised by women, and gays and lesbians. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,
2299 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against recognition of equal protection claim
brought by women against Virginia's maintenance of exclusively male military college);
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (arguing that Colorado
constitutional amendment, which prevents homosexuals from receiving legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial protection from discrimination, does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause). But it is also shaped by some of the unusual features of the Oncale opinion. I draw
this inference partly from Scalia's reluctance to discuss the case's facts, see infra note 9, and
partly from the brevity with which he disposes of the case, punctuated by hasty reassur-
ances that difficult cases can be resolved by reference to common sense. Oncale; 118 S. Ct.
at 1003.
9 Scalia states, "[t]he precise details are irrelevant to the legal point we must decide,
and in the interest of both brevity and dignity we shall describe them only generally."
Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000. Presumably the Court is referring to the dignity ofJoseph On-
cale, although the conclusion that reciting the facts of an actionable legal wrong somehow
disgraces its victim seems both anachronistic (a throwback to a time when sexualized injury
was thought to reflect badly on the victim) and surprisingly gender-specific (this reluctance
is rarely manifest in cases involving the sexualized injury of women). Perhaps Justice Scalia
means to suggest that in the interests of preserving the dignity of the Court, he will not
recite these distasteful facts.
10 Id. at 1003 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
11 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
12 In a passage that strikes me as a model ofjudicious context-specificity, Justice Scalia
writes:
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constella-
tion of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which
are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physi-
cal acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social
context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing
or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or
abusive.
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suggestion that one can resolve these cases with a healthy dose of com-
mon sense.' 3 Most importantly, the opinion throws the door open to
an entirely new-and heretofore almost entirely marginaized 14-
group of claimants.
While the Supreme Court has limited itself to fairly general sug-
gestions about the contours of the sexual harassment claim, many
commentators have imparted a clearer and more specific message. A
dominant theme in both scholarly and popular commentary has been
that the sexual harassment claim risks distracting us with a censorious
focus on sex, when the real focus should be on denial of equal em-
ployment opportunity. Some commentators have advanced this claim
with care and nuance. Vicki Schultz, for example, encouraged courts
to see the continuity between sexualized and nonsexualized forms of
harassment and to consider harassment to be a mode of establishing
masculine competence as a requirement for the most desirable lines
of work.' 5 Other variants of this claim have been less nuanced and
more disturbing. The New Yorker has run a series of articles that de-
scribe sexual harassment law as threatening to undermine claims of
discrimination that do not involve sexual misconduct. The most dis-
turbing of these articles was a recent piece by Jeffrey Toobin, 16 which
criticized Catharine MacKinnon for entrenching the view that there is
"no sex without harassment... and no harassment without sex,"' 7 and
presented Vicki Schultz's focus on non-sexualized harassment as a
competing model or antidote.' 8
Oncak 118 S. Ct at 1003.
13 Judicial reference to common sense seems to me all too frequently to presage the
application of a judge's often gendered intuitions. I make this point in Kathryn Abrams,
Social Construction, Roving Biologism and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41
DEPAUL L. REv. 1021, 1033-34 (1992).
14 The paradigmatic case prior to Oncale had been Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp.
1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988), which denied recovery to a man who had been subjected to punish-
ing verbal and physical harassment because of his perceived gender nonconformity.
15 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassmen4 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
16 Jeffrey Toobin, The Trouble With Sex: Wy the Law of Sexual Harassment Has Never
Worked, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 48.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 55. To my mind this article mischaracterizes MacKinnon, who has not argued
either that all sexual expression in the workplace constitutes harassment or that nonsexual-
ized conduct is excluded from the definition of harassment. See Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Letter to the Editor, THE Naw YORKER, Feb. 23 & Mar. 2, 1998, at 28. It also mischaracter-
izes Schultz, who describes a focus on sexualized harassment as insufficient, but proposes
that her emphasis on nonsexualized harassment be added to the definition of harassment,
not used to replace it. See Schultz, supra note 15, at 1690 ("It is not enough to focus on the
harm to women as sexual beings; the law must also address women's systematic disadvan-
tage.. . ."). Toobin's article has the additional defect of attempting to play feminist schol-
ars off against each other it uses the appeal of Schultz's new focus to try to forge
opposition to MacKinnon. See Toobin, supra note 16, at 55.
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These developments make for a confusing, yet potentially pivotal,
moment in the public understanding of sexual harassment. Since
they arise from public events and enlist popular opinion, and since
some antagonize rather than reinterpret the sexual harassment claim,
these developments may effect a more substantial realignment than
anything I glimpsed in The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment.'9 In
this scenario, the Supreme Court is not the primary culprit, although
its failure to resolve Oncale in a fully elaborated way creates a potential
problem. If the Court has opened the gates, it has made little effort to
define the terrain that lies inside. Into this vacuum moves a public
overwhelmed by the pervasiveness of alleged sexual scandals and disil-
lusioned with the difficulties of parsing sexualized misconduct. Also
converging on this space are a series of commentators such as Toobin,
who comfortingly suggest that the problem with which we should be
concerned is not sex, but rather discrimination-a comparatively
tractable problem that places liability on familiar, readily-identifiable
villains. Before long, the public will lose the will to sort out appropri-
ate sexuality from coercive sexuality, to see inequality in exchanges or
relationships where inequality had not been glimpsed before, and to
connect these problems-as Vicki Schultz invites us to do20-with
harassing or unequal treatment that does not take a sexualized form.
If these consequences occur, they will decisively contract the horizons
that Supreme Court doctrine appeared to open in Vinson,21 Harris,22
and Oncale23 In this moment, it seems to me, we need a theory of
sexual harassment that reminds us of the harm that can be done to
women, and men, when sex is used as a vehicle for entrenching ine-
qualities of power. At the same time this theory must combine this
insight with an understanding that many means of instantiating a
power hierarchy between men and women, masculine and feminine,
do not rely on sex. It is with this thought that I turn to the responses
of Professors Bernstein and Franke.
I
I admire Professor Bernstein's spirited defense of her article, 24
particularly the witty, articulate thrust and parry for which she has be-
come well-known. While a part of me wants simply to watch the sparks
fly, I will offer a few thoughts on the grounds of our disagreement.
19 Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169 (1998) [hereinafter The New Jurisprudence].
20 Schultz, supra note 15.
21 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
22 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
23 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
24 Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 1231,
1244 (1998).
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Professor Bernstein and I may never agree about the "respectful"
versus the "reasonable" person, and there is no doubt some irony in
the positions that we espouse: the advocate of systematic change de-
fends the old term, while the proponent of "an old jurisprudence"
flies the banner of the new. Yet I am less concerned with my decade
of investment in the term "reasonable" than with courts' comparable
investment. If the decisive question, as I suspect Bernstein agrees, is
less the particular word used than the gloss that comes to be placed
on it by triers of fact, it seems unproductive to distract the courts from
this process of elaboration by the interjection of a new term. This is
particularly true if the presently-used term-in this case, reasonable-
ness-can be construed in a way that will do the job. Here, of course,
Professor Bernstein and I differ. She argues that a largely Republican-
appointed judiciary25 will have no patience for my suggestions, let
alone the academic language in which they are sometimes couched. 26
Yet, interestingly, the actual record of judicial performance here is
more promising. Nearly a dozen federal and state courts have used or
cited the work of feminist commentators on the "reasonable woman"
standard.2 7 Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court has sig-
nalled a willingness to take account of feminist thinking on the "rea-
sonableness" standard. When Justice Scalia is willing to talk about "a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the cir-
cumstances'," 28 we may have a trajectory with which we can work.
However, as I argued in The New Jurisprudence,29 and as Justice
Scalia's perplexing opinion in Oncale made clear,30 the particular stan-
dard used for assessing pervasiveness is ultimately less important than
the characterization of the wrong of sexual harassment itself. Here
Professor Bernstein and I continue to have differences as well. Bern-
25 Professor Bernstein is correct that I have aimed my interpretive proposals at the
judiciary (and of course, at advocates), see id. at 1238, preferring to let those who are far
more experienced than me frame these matters for jurors.
26 Id. at 1238-39.
27 Bernstein notes that seven judicial opinions have cited the elaboration of the rea-
sonable woman standard offered in Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms. Id. at 1231 n.4 (discussing citations to Kathryn Abrams, GenderDiscrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989)). My own subsequent re-
search revealed that a comparable number of courts had cited work by feminist legal schol-
ars such as Nancy Ehrenreich and Naomi Cahn. Naomi Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CoRnrLL L. Rv. 1398
(1992); Nancy Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myth and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
28 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993)).
29 The New Jurisprudence, supra note 19, at 1184.
30 See supra text following note 9 (arguing that Oncale opinion, while promising in
some of its context-specific language, does not offer an account of the wrong of sexual
harassment that explains why same-sex cases should be included within Title VII's
coverage).
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stein argues that she has not obscured the gender-based harm of sex-
ual harassment.31 She has simply left that harm to be debated and
elaborated through the political process, while she has introduced
into the adjudicative context a more palatable proxy appropriate to
the single-litigant, private right context of a Tite VII action.3 2 She
argues that in my endorsement of a gendered, politically-situated ac-
count of the harm, I have invoked an unacceptably anachronistic con-
cept of group rights that is ill-suited to the private law structure of
Title VII.33
Bernstein's argument conflates two things: first, the legal or insti-
tutional approach to addressing a wrong; and second, the conceptual-
ization or understanding of that wrong itself. My approach is aimed at
the latter, yet Bernstein describes it as aiming at, or at least implicat-
ing, the former.3 4 Professor Bernstein is no doubt correct that I en-
dorse some conceptions of group rights and the innovative judicial
roles they occasion. 35 However, this has little to do with my position
on sexual harassment. The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment does
not propose class actions, structural injunctions, judicial management
of complex lawsuits, or any of the other features that effected a con-
vergence between adjudicatory and more broadly participatory poli-
tics. I make recourse to a statute that recognizes private rights, closely
interrelates rights and remedies, and is substantially party-initiated
and party controlled.3 6 Contrary to Bernstein's claims, these features
need not dictate our understanding of the wrong that the statute
serves to right.
Feminist legal reform has often made use of statutes that grant a
private right of action to address a wrong that has individual manifes-
tations, but collective significance. 37 In finding this private injury a
31 Bernstein, supra note 24, at 1233-34.
32 Id. at 1241-43.
33 Id. at 1241-42.
34 Id. at 124043.
35 See LARRY YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET (1989) (examining Judge Johnson's struc-
tural injunctive approaches to reform in schools, prisons and mental institutions).
36 1 accept Bernstein's description, arguendo, although I would note that this descrip-
tion obscures the often important role of the EEOC in bringing actions under Tide VII,
encouraging conciliation, issuing right-to-sue letters, and more.
37 I would place Tide VII (both its broad contours and the sexual harassment claim
pioneered by Catharine MacKinnon) in this category, as well as the MacKinnon-Dworkin
Anti-Pornography Ordinance, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1125-26 & n.1
(12th ed. 1991) (discussing the ordinance), and the more recent Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). An interesting case interpreting the Act that sheds
light on this notion of an injury with individual manifestations but group-based signifi-
cance is Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), vacated reh'g granted en banc (Feb. 5, 1998). The Fourth Circuit reversed a lower
court decision, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779
(W.D. Va. 1996) in which the court sought to distinguish between rapes motivated by "gen-
1262 [Vol. 83:1257
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matter of public concern, the statute commits itself to addressing a
kind of wrong that has a group-based character and a political sali-
ence.38 But the public, or political character of the wrong is not rele-
vant simply in bringing the individual instances under the statutory
ambit. It is relevant to the way that they are adjudicated. Though the
plaintiff alleges an individualized injury to establish her standing and
make out her claim for relief, she makes recourse to the social or
group-based significance of that injury in order to interpret her claim
and distinguish it from those that may not belong under the statute.
This is, as Katherine Franke has argued,3 9 why we need a collective,
politically-grounded account of the wrong of sexual harassment to ex-
plain why same-sex cases should come under the statute. And this is
what is ultimately unsatisfying about Justice Scalia's intermittently
promising opinion in Oncale. he recognizes the individual injury (and
by implication, some others sufficiently like it), but leaves the collec-
tive, integrative account of the wrong to another day.
I am willing to credit Professor Bernstein's argument that her
strategy is less a knowing depoliticization of sexual harassment than a
der animus" and rapes motivated by the victim's personality. See id. at 785 ("date rape
could involve in part disrespect for the victim as a person, not as a woman"). As the latter
quote indicates, the lower court judge sought to characterize a particular kind of injury
solely in relation to an individual transaction and not in relation to its broader group-based
significance.
A slight variation of this theme in the context of a non-civil rights statute is provided
by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994). This act specifies proce-
dures to be followed, and individual and tribal rights that must be respected in the context
of custody proceedings termination of parental rights, or foster care placements, involving
an Indian child. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1912 (1994). Although the actions concern the
placement or custody of an individual child, the rights of intervention or jurisdiction
granted reflect collective familial and tribal interests in such placement or custody, as well
as a relation between tribal interests and the welfare of the individual Indian child.
38 Bernstein correctly notes that Professors Fiss and Chayes largely confined their con-
ceptions of 'structural litigation' to the constitutional context. Bernstein, supra note 24, at
1240-41. Yet her suggestion that the concept of group rights never extended beyond the
constitutional realm and, particularly, that, now that the Equal Protection Clause has be-
come a font of "individual" rights, statutory discrimination claims must follow suit, supra
note 24, at 1241, seems to me incorrect. Statutory claims like Title VII or the Voting Rights
Act do consider injured plaintiffs as member of groups and sometimes even award group-
conscious remedies. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VHI and the Complex Female Subjec 92 MIcH.
L. REv. 2479 (1994) (observing that some courts are willing to characterize claimants as
members of one group, but that those courts experience conceptual and doctrinal diffi-
culty when plaintiffs present themselves as members of more than one group). This is why
an increasingly conservative Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to put brakes on
what can be done remedially under these statutes. The voting rights area is a case in point.
Since the Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), claimants may invoke the
Equal Protection Clause to challenge race-conscious districting schemes, which have been
the remedy of choice under the Voting Rights Act See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996) (finding race-conscious districting violates Equal Protection Clause); Miller v.John-
son, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same).
39 SeeKatherine Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment2, 49 STAN. L. Rtv. 691-98
(1997).
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relegation of more politicized accounts of this injury to other, more
appropriately political fora.40 But this is still a worrisome abdication
for reasons that both Justice Scalia's Oncale opinion and the present
public ferment over sexual harassment make clear. The courts have
not functioned in these private claim/public law cases as an apolitical
arena for the adjudication of politically-neutralized claims. On the
contrary, they have played a leadership role in declaring the social
significance of the injury and defining its contours. Sexual harass-
ment has become a social issue in large part because it has become a
legal issue, and citizens often use the increasingly Delphic pronounce-
ments of the Court41 as a means of interpreting the social practices
they see around them.42 When the courts fail to do justice to this role,
as Justice Scalia demonstrates and Professor Bernstein seems to rec-
ommend, a confused public can assign less satisfactory, even politi-
cally regressive, meanings to the practices they observe. It is this
larger challenge of providing a group-based, or politically-situated, ac-
count of sexual harassment that Professor Franke addresses, and to
which I now turn.
II
Katherine Franke is surely correct when she writes that our differ-
ences appear obvious only to "the overinitiated. ''43 In fact, I am con-
vinced that even the most overinitiated-namely, she and I-see our
approaches as converging on a common understanding and set of
goals. Although the following discussion seeks to clarify some of the
differences in emphasis that may remain, its primary object is to reaf-
firm the shared enterprise and identify some of the future challenges
that follow from that enterprise.
40 Bernstein, supra note 24, at 1243.
41 In conversations about the Oncale opinion, I have found that many people, includ-
ing lawyers, seem to view the extreme brevity of the opinion (and its Supreme Court prede-
cessor, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1993)) as an advantage. While I do
not necessarily endorse the extended, fractured opinions we have come to recognize as
Supreme Court decisions, I wonder whether a four or seven page opinion can provide the
clarification that may be required for a complex evolving claim such as the sexual harass-
ment claim.
42 Two stories in The New York Times published on the day I wrote this section docu-
ment this point. First, a front-page storyjuxtaposes the public confusion over the meaning
of sexual harassment evident in the debate over President Clinton's alleged conduct with
the clarifying role played by the Court and suggests that the record number of cases to be
decided by the Court this year may help to mitigate this confusion. Second, in an op-ed
defense of President Clinton, Gloria Steinem distinguishes his conduct from that of Sena-
tor Bob Packwood and other alleged harassers by arguing that his conduct does not satisfy
the requirements of an actionable case of sexual harassment. See Tamar Lewin, Debate Cen-
tes on Definition of Harassment, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al; Gloria Steinem, Feminist
and the Clinton Question, Mar. 22, 1998, at D15.
43 Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply To Professor
Abrams, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 1245, 1246 (1998).
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I agree with Professor Franke's suggestion that a proper ap-
proach to sexual harassment (or any other gender-based injury) has
both a "local" and a "systemic" dimension: the first explains how par-
ticular institutional and cultural practices do their work, and the sec-
ond locates these practices within a systemic hierarchy of power that
makes men, and masculinity, dominant, and women, and femininity,
subordinate.44 If we differ, it is because her discussion of sexual har-
assment tends to draw the first category slightly more narrowly than I
would draw it. Franke's 'local' analysis is focused on practices that
"gender males as masculine and females as feminine. '45 While I ac-
knowledge that this "gender confinement" is one salient dynamic that
occurs in the workplace, I argue that there are also other dynamics
concerned with the subordination of women or the devaluation of the
feminine, the marking of workplaces as normatively masculine, and
more.46 These other dynamics-some of which highlight the subordi-
nation of women more strongly than does Franke's explanation-are
not only implicit in the systemic hierarchy; they also pervade local
practices, such as sexual harassment. We need an account of discrimi-
nation that highlights this variety of dynamics at both local and sys-
temic levels. This was a central goal in my interpretation of sexual
harassment as "preserv[ing] male control and entrench[ing] male
norms in the workplace."47
The emphasis on gender confinement in Franke's analysis of sex-
ual harassment is one factor that led me to question the viability of a
theory of hetero-patriarchy for interpreting this claim. I worried that a
focus on the formation and disciplining of masculinity and feminin-
ity-which seemed to characterize Franke's analysis-might displace a
focus on women's subordination, which seemed to me to be appropri-
ately at the center of sexual harassment analysis. This worry seemed to
be borne out by the fact that Franke made little reference to the work-
place as the site of harassment or to the agonistic dynamic between
men and women that has characterized that site. Franke's defense of
her approach, however, relieves some of these concerns. While ac-
knowledging the dynamics specific to the workplace that I cite, she
describes her account as comprehending a broader domain of harass-
ment that includes schools as well as the workplace. 48 Moreover, she
vigorously defends the flexibility of a theory of hetero-patriarchy,
noting,
44 Franke, supra note 43, at 1252.
45 Id. at 1252.
46 The NewJurisprudence supra note 19, at 1205-12.
47 Id. at 1172.
48 Franke, supra note 43, at 1247-50.
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[o]ne of the explanatory features of hetero-patriarchy that I find so
satisfying is its capacity to provide an account for multiple trajecto-
ries of power: sex-based, gender-based, and sexual orientation-
based. These dynamics tend to be mutually constitutive in a particu-
lar context .... Hetero-patriachy is designed to be flexible enough
to respond to-each of these complex situations. 49
I suspect that the difference between a theory of hetero-patri-
archy that traces variation in the operation of its different dimensions
and a theory of gender subordination that comprehends effects on
both women and men is more illusory than real. This does not deny
that some differences in emphasis or application may remain. As her
response suggests, Franke's interpretation of harassment is premised
on a conception of that term that comprehends both the workplace
and such phenomena as peer harassment in the educational con-
text.5 0 I would argue that a theory of hetero-patriarchy, or of gender
subordination, must address 'local' practices at a level that is even
more institutionally-specific. While I acknowledge the similarities
Franke sees between the work and school settings, I also see a number
of salient differences between these settings, including: the degree of
gender socialization of perpetrators and targets; the presumed compe-
tence of perpetrators and targets to make choices about their sexual
lives; the degree of hierarchy that is present in the environment; the
level of control that perpetrators exercise over the structure of the
setting; and the history of female access to or male entitlement in the
particular environment. 51 A theory of hetero-patriarchy, in the end,
may differ little from a theory of gender subordination that acknowl-
edges coercive or constraining effects on men.5 2 Either theory, how-
ever, should exhibit enough nuance to highlight different dynamics
and the influence of different circumstances.
49 Id. at 1252-53.
50 Id. at 1247-50. Franke suggests that this more comprehensive definition explains
why she did not focus in particular on dynamics specific to the workplace. Id. at 1250.
51 Admittedly these factors may also differentiate one workplace from another or dif-
ferentiate a school case involving a teacher-perpetrator from a school case involving a stu-
dent-perpetrator. As a general matter, however, these factors are likely to make the
analysis different in school cases than in workplace cases, and I believe they call for institu-
tionally-specific 'local' analyses. I took the workplace as a focus because it has tended to be
paradigmatic in sexual harassment litigation; however, I might have added that school-
based harassment is also harassment, although it may exhibit a different combination of
dynamics or institutional factors.
52 Contrary to Professor Franke's suggestion, see Franke, supra note 43, at 1253, I
would argue that my account grasps the reflexive effect of sexual harassment on men. See
The NewJurisprudence, supra note 19, at 1219 (stating that the socially constructing effects of
sexual harassment "affect perpetrators as well as targets"). I see Professor Franke's point,
however, since this element was partially submerged in a discussion that sought to empha-
size a dynamic of women's struggle against subordination.
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The priority placed on highlighting variability may be another
factor that slightly distinguishes Professor Franke's theory from my
own. This difference may arise in part from the different postures
that we assume in introducing our arguments. Professor Franke-like
Professor Schultz53-sought to bring to the center of sexual harass-
ment law an element that had been excluded or relegated to the mar-
gins.54 This effort at inclusion virtually requires a presentation that
focuses on that particular element, even if this gives the theory as a
whole a more unitary or less variable tone than the author might
otherwise prefer. I, on the other hand, have had the luxury of observ-
ing these arguments for inclusion, and of reflecting on the way that
these arguments are assimilated by a public and commentators who
seem to search endlessly for a single, unitary explanation of gender-
based phenomena, or who play one explanation (or feminist com-
mentator) off against another. Buttressed by the contributions of
scholars such as Professors Franke and Schultz, I can argue for a the-
ory that underscores both its own diversity of dynamics and the con-
tingency of these dynamics in their application to different
circumstances. 55
But whatever the source of this difference, I believe a theory that
directs attention specifically to the multiplicity and variability of the
dynamics that characterize sexual harassment is essential. It is part of
the struggle that I described in The New Jurisprudence when I sought to
highlight the complexity of the phenomenon of gender subordina-
tion more generally. And it is particularly necessary at a point when
the public may feel overtaxed with the difficulties of sorting out one
particular dynamic-the sexualized oppression of women by men-
and may be looking for an opportunity to replace it with another, be it
non-sexualized harassment, sexual harassment as gender confine-
ment, or something else. We must be clear that no single dynamic
excludes any other, and a theory of sexual harassment as
"preserv[ing] male control and entrench[ing] masculine norms in the
workplace"56 begins to convey this understanding.
53 Schultz, supra note 15.
54 A task at which, I would note, Professor Franke has largely succeeded.
55 One of the aspects of sexual harassment in which I try to document diversity is the
way that it affects women's agency. In her response, Professor Franke focuses on the rela-
tionship between sexual harassment and women's sexual agency, see Franke, supra note 43,
at 1254-55, which is appropriately one part of the picture. But I did not primarily intend to
use interference with sexual agency as an indication of when sexual harassment had oc-
curred; rather, I intended to suggest more broadly that sexual harassment is a practice that
interferes with women's agency in different contexts: as sexual subjects, as workers, as wo-
men who seek to make the sometimes-validating transition to the world of work, and as
human beings who seek to project themselves in different ways.
56 The NewJurisprudenc, supra note 19, at 1172.
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As Professors Bernstein and Franke would doubtless agree, many
heads-and many distinct understandings-are needed to negotiate
this difficult moment in the public understanding of sexual harass-
ment. I am grateful that they have participated so provocatively and
so thoughtfully in this forum with me.
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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of debates over the meaning of the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution lies the question what role his-
tory should play in the interpretation of the constitutional text. The
relevant text itself is not in dispute: the Amendment provides that the
'Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State."2 A few salient historical points also appear
relatively free from doubt: President John Adams proclaimed the
Amendment to be a "Part of the Constitution" on January 8, 1798,3
1 SIR HENRY SPELMAN, Of Parliaments, in REuQULE SPELMANNIANzE: THE POsTHUMOUS
WORKS OF SIR HENRY SPELMAN 57, 57 (Oxford, Printed at the Theater for Awnsham andJ.
Churchill 1698).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3 For the text of the Adams proclamation, see 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 637-38 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994)
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